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ABSTRACT: The aim of this essay is to provide an analysis of Fou-
cault’s use of the notion of revolution in the reports he wrote for
Il Corriere della Sera during his two trips to Iran in September
and November 1978. Foucault critically frames the historical and
philosophical concept of revolution, in order to oppose it to the
spreading revolts against the Shah, which embody the simple and
negative opening of the possibility of a transformation in history.
Yet is it possible to reactivate the notion of revolution in a non-
restrictive sense in order to think about the role and the possibility
of political revolts and freedom today?
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‘Revolution’ is a central concept in Western contempor-
ary philosophy. Since Kant, and then Hegel andMarx, the
term revolution has taken on a double meaning: (1) the
embodiment of freedom in history, the sign of the open-
ness of historical times, the ability to change, following the
free practical human nature, and to progress towards the
better; (2) the achievement of history itself— for example,
a proletarian revolution in Marxist thought, which will ac-
complish the destruction of the old world and create the
new communist era. Revolution is a capital turning point
in the history of humanity, realizing human freedom and
pushing it to its limits.WhenKant, in his essayTheConflict
of the Faculties (1798), reflects on the revolution that can
be considered the beginning of the contemporary world
— the French Revolution — he transforms it, in its pure
revolutionary form, regardless of its historical context, re-
sults, or consequences, into a decisive moral and political
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sign. Is there any concretemoment in history that could in-
dicate, reliably, that humanity as a whole advances towards
improvement? Is there any historical event that proves pro-
gress in themoral world? For Kant, the French Revolution
is this sign of progress, not as a specific political transform-
ation but as a public event, filling the hearts of spectators
with enthusiasm, sympathetic participation, and faith in
the realization of justice. Revolution is the actualization of
freedom, and the utopia of its achievement beyond all time
and history.
Thepresent contribution aims at analysing this double
meaning of the revolution as an ‘operational value in his-
tory’1 through a particular group of articles Michel Fou-
cault wrote and which have been more vigorously criti-
cized than any other part of hisœuvre: the reporting he did
for Il Corriere della Sera during his two journeys to Iran in
September andNovember 1978. In these articles, Foucault
describes the revolts against the Shah’s regime and suggests
to read them against a certain understanding of the notion
of revolution, through a fascinating and, at the same time,
highly ambiguous concept: that of a ‘political spirituality’.2
I shall briefly analyse this notion, exploring its link to the
Western notion of revolution. I shall then argue that, des-
pite Foucault’s rejection of this notion, revolution is still
a very important concept to reactivate in order to think
1 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others. Lectures at the
Collège de France, 1982–1983, trans. by G. Burchell (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010), p. 20.
2 Michel Foucault, ‘À quoi rêvent les Iraniens?’ [1978], in Dits et écrits,
ed. by Daniel Defert, François Ewald and Jacques Lagrange, 2 vols
(Paris: Gallimard, 2001), ii: 1976–1988, text no. 245, p. 694: ‘Quel
sens, pour les hommes qui habitent [la terre d’Iran], à rechercher
au prix même de leur vie cette chose dont nous avons, nous autres,
oublié la possibilité depuis la Renaissance et les grandes crises du
christianisme: une spiritualité politique.’
ARIANNA SFORZINI 165
about the role and the possibility of political revolts and
freedom today.
The Foucault Archive at the Bibliothèque nationale
in Paris contains the complete set of documents Foucault
gathered during and after his Iranian journeys. 3 I wasmost
impressed by a journal of sorts Foucault kept while in Iran,
full of historical, political, and personal notes about the
country he was discovering. It shows a true journalistic
spirit; the reader can feel Foucault’s pleasure in discovering
a country on the verge of a major political transformation
andhis desire to understand this historical turningpoint by
analysing the economic, geopolitical, and cultural situation
in Iran. He is not a philosopher looking at history from the
superior standpoint of abstract reason, but a witness and a
reporter giving voice to the historical fractures and forces
he encounters on the ground.
Foucault is definitely fascinated by what could be
called the ‘negative character’ of the Iranian revolt against
Reza Pahlavi: it was a popular uprising, originated in a
seemingly spontaneous way; there weren’t, at the begin-
ning, any main ideological directions, political parties, or
institutions to guide it; and still, the revolt wasmassive, un-
divided, and capable of a major disruption of the political
order. Foucault saw the rise of an entire unarmed people,
united by the only aim of ‘saying no to the Shah’. Before the
return of Khomeini, the Shiite Islamic voices went along
with the strong Marxist movement in Iran and other op-
position forces. The religious state was a political utopia
reconnecting with an idealized past, and Foucault couldn’t
imagine in 1978 that the revolt he was witnessing could re-
sult in an oppressive clerical regime. Most importantly, in
3 Michel Foucault Archives, Bibliothèque nationale de France, boîtes
50–50bis (NAF 28730).
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his articles, he refuses to speak of an Iranian ‘Revolution’:
this concept is for him ideologically charged, meaning a
historical violent riot led and used by a political party,
group, or class. One can say that Khomeini transformed
the Iranian revolt into a revolution, but what Foucault first
sawwas a ‘soulèvement’: the simple and negative opening of
the possibility of a transformation in history; a disruption
of the concrete political situation making room for some-
thing new to arise.
Revolution organizes itself according to a temporal
economy: conditions, promises, necessities; it
resides thus in history, makes its bed in it, and
ultimately lies in it. The uprising [le soulèvement],
breaking the order of time, raises men upright
against their land and their humanity.4
Did Foucault underestimate the power of the Islamic
clergy? Definitely. But was Khomeini’s regime really the
only possible outcome of the revolt against the Shah? Yet
more importantly, even after the religious and despotic
turn in Iran, Foucault claimed the relevance of a notion
he first used in his Iranian reportage: that of a ‘political
spirituality’. It is clearly an ambiguous expression, one
which resulted at the end of the 1970s in amassive critique
of the French philosopher, accusing him to have indirectly
legitimated the Khomeinist regime. Actually, Foucault
was far from imagining the theocratic outcome of the
Iranian revolt. What he did see, however, was the massive
4 ‘La révolution s’organise selon toute une économie intérieure au temps:
des conditions, des promesses, des nécessités; elle loge donc dans
l’histoire, y fait son lit et finalement s’y couche. Le soulèvement,
coupant le temps, dresse les hommes à la verticale de leur terre et de
leur humanité.’ (‘Vivre autrement le temps’ [1979], in Dits et écrits, II:
text no. 267, pp. 788–90 (p. 790) [my translation]).
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potential of a revolt rooted in a religious and existential
dimension.
The importance of Foucault’s articles lies in the in-
sights they provide into the essential role Islam and its
‘political spirituality’ — Islam as a ‘political force’5 —
was and arguably is to play in the contemporary geopolit-
ical world. Foucault sees in the Iranian revolts and in the
revolutionary energy unleashed by their mobilization of
Islamic religion a new form of opposition to state power,
that is to say: to amodernWestern political order, its army,
its police, its embassies. The Iranian revolt is, in Foucault’s
eyes, a ‘counter-behaviour’ to the governmentality of the
modern state. As such, it can serve as a privileged plat-
form for political observation and experimentation. The
Western-style ‘modernization’ coveted by the Shah and by
United States policy towards Iran is actually an attempt to
reproduce Eurocentric models of state organization. And
the revolts against these attempts are for Foucault ‘perhaps
the first great insurrection against global systems, the form
of revolt that is the most modern and the most insane’.6
In Iran, religion proves to be a force that is able to oppose
the existential and political constraints of the very modern
state whose history Foucault had so tirelessly reconstruc-
ted in order to find news ways to criticize it.
Foucault is aware that Islam risks becoming ‘a gigantic
powder-keg’ on a global scale.7 His statements are clearly
relevant today, in light of what has since happened in the
5 Michel Foucault, ‘Foucault’s Response to Atoussa H.’ [1978], trans. by
Karen deBruin andKevinB.Anderson, in JanetAfary andKevinB.An-
derson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions
of Islamism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 210.
6 Michel Foucault, ‘The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt’ [1978],
trans. by Karen de Bruin and Kevin B. Anderson, in Afary and Ander-
son, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, pp. 220–23 (p. 222).
7 Michel Foucault, ‘A Powder Keg Called Islam’ [1979], trans. by Karen
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Middle East and in Europe: the rise of religious radicalism,
the increasing numbers of migrants fleeing conflicts in Is-
lamic countries, the West’s difficulties in intervening and
imposing its control and its security strategies. Foucault
interrogates the field of ethical-political subjectivation for
a Europe (a European way of conceiving of the state) that
is in decline and aWest which is globalizing the world, yet
finds itself called into question by this very process of glob-
alization. Through his reflections on the particular case of
Iran, he raises the general question: beyond the European
identity crisis, how, and by means of what poles and rela-
tions, do we create political subjectivities?
Paradoxically enough, Foucault deploys a massive set
of knowledge about Iranian history and Islamic religion in
order to develop a strictly Eurocentric reflection on revolt
and revolution. Foucault said the Iranian revolt was not,
at its beginning, a revolution, as it was not dominated by
an ideology. And yet, it was a concrete example of what
revolution has meant in Western thought since Kant and
the French Revolution: the opening of new possibilities
in time and history, demanding a form of philosophical
discourse which is no longer the ahistorical investigation
of the universal conditions of human thought but the re-
sponse to actual political needs. Foucault’s various analyses
of Kant’s 1784 essay ‘An Answer to the Question: What
is Enlightenment’ prove this point: revolution has been,
for the contemporary Western world, the actual evidence
that history is an open process, through which it has to
rethink and test its forms of discourse, thought, and exist-
ence. Could Iran and its ‘revolt/revolution’ play the same
de Bruin and Kevin B. Anderson, in Afary and Anderson, Foucault and
the Iranian Revolution, pp. 239–41 (p. 241).
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role of critique for 1970s and 1980s Europe, andmaybe for
today’s world?
Foucault’s controversial concept of ‘political spiritual-
ity’must not be thought as a sort of apologetic of a political
power built on religion. Rather, it conveys the important
idea that a true political movement cannot exist unless it is
built on an existential transformation — that is the sense
of the notion of ‘spirituality’ used by Foucault later, in the
1980s, to indicate the exercises of the self. In all likeli-
hood, Foucault stresses the fact that religion is (and has
been inWestern history) amassive political force also stra-
tegically, against the French doctrine of laicism as a sort
of ‘anaesthetization’ of the political sphere. The real ques-
tion Foucault poses to the present moment would then
be: are political spirituality and revolution possible out-
side ideological dogmas? Which political energy can be
deployed today that is rooted in existential practices and
strong enough to be the motor of historical change?
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